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THE TRAGEDY OF JUSTICE SCALIA
Mitchell N. Berman*
A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. By
Antonin Scalia. Princeton and Chichester: Princeton University
Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 149. $18.95.
Introduction
Justice Antonin Scalia died last February, at the age of seventy-nine.
Having served nearly three decades on the Supreme Court, he was, by the
time of his death, its best known and most influential member, the subject
of two substantial biographies,1 hundreds of academic articles,2 and possibly
thousands more in the popular press. If the most visible and vocal justice of
the past quarter century, Scalia was also the most polarizing—the judicial
equivalent of stinky cheese.3
Given the magnitude of Scalia’s renown and the intensity of the passions
he has engendered, it would be folly to advance in this space any bold new
thesis on his jurisprudence or judicial legacy. My ambitions, accordingly, are
less grand. They are to offer an account of his central jurisprudential claims,
the arguments he marshaled, and the difficulties they encountered, in a fashion that might enable partisans on both sides of today’s legal, cultural, and
political divides to see a little more clearly at least some of what their opponents see—the other side of Scalia’s legacy. I will try to accomplish that task
by concentrating on his Tanner Lectures delivered at Princeton two decades
ago and published, complete with scholarly comments and his response, as
A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. You might say that
my modest goal for this twenty-year retrospective on Scalia’s best-known
and most important book is to render Justice Scalia two-dimensional.
* Leon Meltzer Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Professor
of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania. For very helpful conversations or comments on a
previous draft, I am grateful to Larry Alexander, Ryan Doerfler, Jonah Gelbach, Dave
Hoffman, and Richard Primus. I am also indebted to Mariah Ford and David Peters for
excellent and timely research assistance. I dedicate this article to the Honorable J. Dickson
Phillips, Jr., a great judge, and a humane and decent man.
1. Joan Biskupic, American Original: The Life and Constitution of Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia (2009); Bruce Allen Murphy, Scalia: A Court of One
(2014). Although not biographies, full-length explorations of Scalia’s legal theory include
Ralph A. Rossum, Antonin Scalia’s Jurisprudence: Text and Tradition (2006), and
James B. Staab, The Political Thought of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Hamiltonian on
the Supreme Court (2006).
2. A Westlaw Law Reviews & Journals search for the term “TI(Scalia)” returns over 350
hits.
3. To put my own (turophilic) cards on the table: I’ve yet to meet a cheese too stinky.
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Because I will try to make a case both for what was truly great and for
what was profoundly flawed about Scalia the jurist, the account that follows
depicts him as a tragic figure. That is not a novel characterization.4 But it
remains disappointingly marginal. Too often, Scalia’s critics demonize him
as a simple villain,5 while his acolytes glorify him as a paladin without
warts.6 These are disturbingly partial visions. Commentators who remain
blind to the truths that others see vividly will never adequately understand
the complex legacy of this complex man.
But that is not all. Although tragedies and tragic figures abound in life,
tragedy’s natural home is in the theater. Tragedies are performed for an
audience. And the power, value, and meaning of tragedy “lies in its capacity
to elicit the audience’s response.”7 Now, precisely how tragedy should affect
an audience, or precisely what the audience is supposed to learn, is controversial. If theorists of tragedy agree on anything, it’s that, while a concept of
tragedy has been vital in Western culture since ancient Greece, its content,
assumed functions, and associated norms, have varied across time and
place.8 Still, there are lessons we can learn—not only about him, but also
about our own condition—by understanding Scalia in tragic terms. Or so I
hope to show.
I. Scalia’s Argument
A Matter of Interpretation is a short book. Scalia’s own contributions to
it are shorter still. His initial text runs only forty-five pages (pp. 3–47), and
his response to four distinguished commenters (historian Gordon Wood,
philosopher of law Ronald Dworkin, and legal scholars Mary Ann Glendon
and Laurence Tribe) adds another twenty (pp. 129–49). Consistent with its
brevity, Scalia’s arguments are straightforward. They contain both critical
and constructive elements.
4. Indeed, this Review’s title parrots that of two opinion pieces published upon Scalia’s
death. Andrew Koppelman, The Tragedy of Antonin Scalia: How One of the Most Brilliant Jurists
of His Generation Went So Wrong, Salon (Feb. 16, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/
2016/02/16/the_tragedy_of_antonin_scalia_how_one_of_the_most_brilliant_jurists_of_his_
generation_went_so_wrong/ [https://perma.cc/3393-LPGZ]; Eric Posner, The Tragedy of
Antonin Scalia, Slate (Feb. 15, 2016, 1:10 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_poli
tics/jurisprudence/2016/02/the_tragedy_of_antonin_scalia.html [https://perma.cc/LWG8-ZG
68]. Posner, Koppelman, and I have somewhat diverging views regarding what Scalia’s chief
virtues and vices were.
5. See, e.g., Bruce Hay, I Thought I Could Reason with Antonin Scalia: A More Naive
Young Fool Never Drew Breath, Salon (Feb. 27, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2016/
02/27/i_thought_i_could_reason_with_antonin_scalia_a_more_naive_young_fool_never_
drew_breath/ [https://perma.cc/S9E5-6HLF].
6. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Justin Braga, The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin
Scalia: A Response to Professor Bruce Allen Murphy and Professor Justin Driver, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
Liberty 793 (2015).
7. Jennifer Wallace, The Cambridge Introduction to Tragedy 3 (2007).
8. For a nice overview, see Clifford Leech, Tragedy 12–32 (1969). See also A Companion to Tragedy (Rebecca Bushnell ed., 2005).
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Let’s take the critical component first. Judges, Scalia insists, should have
a theory of what they are doing and ought to be doing when interpreting
authoritative legal texts. But, by and large, the American judiciary lacks any
such theory. The “science of construing legal texts” has fallen into neglect
(p. 3). That is sad.
“Even sadder,” he adds, “is the fact that the American bar and American
legal education, by and large, are unconcerned with the fact that we have no
intelligible theory” (p. 14). Devising, extending, and applying common law
rules are no longer the principal occupations of American judges, let alone
of federal judges. Most of their work today involves the interpretation of
texts promulgated by others—statutes, regulations, ordinances, and constitutions. Yet American judges have no articulable theory to guide their efforts
and don’t seem much to care.
Paired with this criticism are what Scalia modestly describes as “suggestions for improvement” (p. 3). They include a general premise and a particular reform proposal. The general premise holds that constitutional and
statutory interpretation are of the same genus and should be subject to the
same rules and principles (pp. 37–38). Scalia’s proposed “methodology” (p.
133) states that judges should endeavor to discern and follow the text’s original meaning with the sole caveat that, under the doctrine of stare decisis,
they should sometimes adhere to erroneous judicial decisions “that are effectively irreversible” (p. 138).
That’s his view in a nutshell. Of course, Scalia supports his methodological proposals with arguments. Starting with his arguments for approach to
statutory interpretation, they can be parsed as follows (where “T” stands for
“textualism”):
(T1) (a) In statutory interpretation, the principal alternative to following
the meaning of the text (textualism) is following “the intent of the
legislature” (p. 16).
(b) When interpreters speak of following “the intent of the legislature,” what they really mean is that judges should follow “the intent
that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law,” in
context (pp. 16–17).
(T2) But there is a practical worry: “[Y]our best shot at figuring out what
the legislature meant is to ask yourself what a wise and intelligent
person should have meant; and that will surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean” (p. 18).
(T3) Therefore, as a practical matter, the only available alternative to textualism in statutory interpretation is for the judge to follow what she
thinks the statutory text ought to mean (pp. 17–18).
(T4) Plainly, it is not compatible with democracy for judges to interpret
statutes in accordance with what they believe the statutory text ought
to mean (p. 22).
(T5) Therefore, judges should attend only to what the text does mean,
which is necessarily what it originally meant.9
9. See p. 38.
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Scalia’s argument about constitutional interpretation follows the same basic structure (“O” is for “originalism”):
(O1) In constitutional interpretation, the principal alternative to following
what the text originally meant (originalism) is following the text’s
current meaning (p. 38).
(O2) But there is a practical worry: your best shot at figuring out the constitutional text’s current meaning is to consult “what it ought to
mean” (p. 39).
(O3) Therefore, as a practical matter, the only available alternative to
originalism in constitutional interpretation is for the judge to follow
what she thinks the constitutional text ought to mean.10
(O4) Plainly, it is not compatible with democracy for judges to interpret
the Constitution in accordance with what they believe the text ought
to mean.11
(O5) Therefore, judges should attend only to what the constitutional text
does mean, which is necessarily what it originally meant.12

II. Critique
What can we say about Scalia’s affirmative position, his textual originalism? This cannot be the place for a full-blown assessment. Instead, I will try
to make clear the most fundamental worries or difficulties that Scalia’s affirmative positions on both statutory and constitutional interpretation
confront.
The root problem is that Scalia is very loose—a critic might say “careless” or even “sloppy”—with the core concepts that interest him and that he
repeatedly invokes. These core concepts are the text, the meanings of the text
(what the text says or communicates), and the law to which the text gives
rise. In short, Scalia invites us to reflect on text, meaning, and law. These are
three different types of entities, yet Scalia routinely conflates them.
There are many nuances in this area, but we needn’t strive for precision.
Roughly: text is an arrangement of signs and symbols; meaning is conveyed,
communicated, or carried by the signs or symbols that the text comprises;13
law is the set of norms—rights, duties, powers, permissions—that a legal
system delivers or comprises.14
10. See pp. 39–40.
11. See p. 40.
12. See p. 38.
13. As Mark Greenberg has emphasized, there are different types of meaning that a statutory text can carry or convey. Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in Philosophical Foundations of
Language in the Law 217, 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011). That is one of
the nuances I’m eliding.
14. Some people, but very few nowadays, believe, or claim to believe, that there is no law.
See, e.g., David R. Dow, Essay, Gödel and Langdell—A Reply to Brown and Greenberg’s Use of
Mathematics in Legal Theory, 44 Hastings L.J. 707, 716–717 (1993). I am assuming the orthodox view that there are legal norms is correct, but I am not providing arguments for that
premise.
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Here’s proof that text is not the same as either meaning or law: different
texts can have the same meaning and can give rise to the same legal obligations or rules. Consider a variation on an example that Scalia provides—a
statute or ordinance that reads, “children under twelve may enter free” (p.
25). Whatever, exactly, this text means, and whatever legal permissions and
obligations it creates, it is exceedingly likely that it bears the same meaning,
and gives rise to the same law, as does a text in a sister jurisdiction that reads
“guests twelve years old and older must pay an admission fee.” The texts are
indubitably different: they share not a word in common. Yet it is at least
plausible—and, to some people, obvious—that they have the same meaning
and give rise to identical law. Therefore, text is not the same as either meaning or law. Also, legislatures sometimes amend a statute, not to change the
law, but to clarify what the law is. That such a maneuver at least occasionally
succeeds establishes again that identical legal norms can correspond to nonidentical text.
And here’s how we know that the meaning of an authoritative legal text
is not the same as the law to which it gives rise: we can sensibly ask whether
the law is what the text means. The proposition that the law is the meaning of
the text represents a substantive claim, not a tautology. Following Ronald
Dworkin, let us call the facts that constitute legal norms the “grounds of
law.”15 It is a substantive question what the grounds of our constitutional or
statutory law are and, in particular, whether they are limited to the text’s
meaning. Somebody who maintains, for example, that the law is the set of
morally best norms that current conventional meanings of the text can bear
might be mistaken (and might not be!), but would not be betraying a conceptual confusion, as would be the case were the meaning of a legal text and
the law to be the same thing. Indeed, James Bradley Thayer justified his
famous “clear error” rule for the exercise of judicial review in part on the
ground that the constitutionality of legislation depends on much broader
and diverse considerations than simply what the text means.16
In short: text, meaning, and law are distinct concepts and phenomena.
Yet throughout A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia runs these distinct ideas
together. I could cite many examples, but will limit myself to three simply to
convey the flavor:
•

Scalia: The main job of federal judges “is to interpret the meaning of
federal statutes and federal agency regulations” (p. 14).

15. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 4 (1986).
16. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 150 (1893) (“When a court is interpreting a writing merely to
ascertain or apply its true meaning, then, indeed, there is but one meaning allowable; namely,
what the court adjudges to be its true meaning. But when the ultimate question is not that, but
whether certain acts of another department, officer, or individual are legal or permissible, then
this is not true. In [such cases], the ultimate question is not what is the true meaning of the
constitution, but whether legislation is sustainable or not.”).
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No. Meaning is an output of interpretation; it is not the thing being
interpreted (i.e., the “interpretandum”). Judges interpret statutes and
regulations in an effort to determine what the law is.
• Scalia: “The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed” (p.
22).
Again, no. Text and law are different things, and it is the law that must
be observed. Texts are not the sort of thing that can be “observed” (in
the sense of being “heeded”; they can, of course, be observed in the
sense of being “seen”).
• Scalia: living constitutionalists flout “the rule that a text does not
change” (p. 40).
Not at all. Living constitutionalists reject the claim that the law does not
change. Their view regarding when a text changes are just the same as
originalists’ view on that question: the text changes only when formally
amended.

Now, you might suspect that I have merely identified infelicities in exposition, and that, although a little cleaning up is clearly necessary, Scalia’s
substantive points need not be affected. My burden in this Part is to show
that that is not so. I’m not playing a game of “Gotcha!” By appreciating the
differences among these three core concepts, we can see that opponents of
textual originalism have much more room to maneuver, and with much
more plausibility, than Scalia recognizes. This is particularly important because, as I explained above, his arguments are, at their core, comparative. If
Scalia is mischaracterizing or ignoring alternatives to the view that he favors,
then his argument fails.
I will start with constitutional interpretation, both because that is my
field of expertise and because once we understand the problems that Scalia’s
theory encounters here, the problem with his views on statutory interpretation will become clearer.
A. Constitutional Interpretation
As we have seen, Scalia argues that constitutional interpreters have two
basic alternatives: either originalism or the view—what he calls “Living
Constitutionalism”—that “the Constitution means what it ought to mean.”
This is not a stray characterization of the view he aims to demolish; Scalia
repeats this very formulation, or a close variant, at least five times.17
But of course none of his intellectual adversaries—“living constitutionalists” or “non-originalists,” labels I will use interchangeably18—describe
their view in these terms. And there is a good reason why they don’t, a
17. See pp. 39, 46, 47, 149.
18. In a previous article, Scalia had favored “non-originalism” as the most accurate term
for the class of theories to be contrasted with his preferred theory, “originalism.” Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 855 (1989). I think that “living
constitutionalism” is not a synonym for non-originalism, but most accurately describes a theory or set of theories that fall within, but do not exhaust, the broader “non-originalist” class.
I’m skipping past any such subtleties here.
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reason that derives from the conceptual difference between the meaning of a
text and the law to which it gives rise. Given that we are ultimately concerned with what the law is, a plausible alternative to originalism runs as
follows (where “LC” represents “living constitutionalism”):
(LC1) what we ultimately care about is what the law is, not what the text
means;
(LC2) what the law is and what the constitutional text means are not identical: the “grounds” of our constitutional law include but are not
limited to the original public meaning of the text; and
(LC3) at least some of the grounds of law do change, thus making it the
case that what the law is also changes.19

That’s a little abstract. The sort of view I have in mind is conveyed,
more or less, by Justice Harlan’s influential account of substantive due process. “Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot
be determined by reference to any code,” he wrote in his famous dissent in
Poe v. Ullman.20 He continued:
The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society. . . . The balance of which I
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions
from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.21

As I read him, Harlan is painting a picture of constitutional norms changing
in evolutionary fashion, in response to changes in our polity’s deep
commitments.
Harlan’s view in Poe concerns the evolving content of constitutionally
protected rights of liberty. But a non-originalist may believe that the point
generalizes—that constitutional guarantees of equality, and constitutional
allocations of powers, also develop in organic, dynamic fashion. A living
constitutionalist who holds a view along these lines will not believe, as Scalia
claims she will, that the constitutional text means what it ought to mean.
19. There are at least two distinct ways in which the grounds of law can change. The
more radical view holds that what is or is not a ground of our law can change over time. The
more moderate view holds that the grounds themselves do not change, but their contents do.
On the former account, to illustrate, it might be that practices of the non-judicial branches
partially constitute our constitutional norms now, but served no constitutive role a century
ago (or vice versa). On the latter account, if practices of the non-judicial branches partially
constitute our constitutional norms now, then such practices have been grounds or determinants of our constitutional norms from the start (what is a ground of law does not change),
but constitutional norms can change over time precisely because the historical practices (that,
by hypothesis, are grounds) themselves change. I accept the more radical thesis, but the “living
constitutionalist” picture I’ve sketched in text requires only the more modest thesis.
20. 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542; see also, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 871–77
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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She will believe that the constitutional law is what it is (not what it ought to
be), and that what it is currently is a function of diverse, possibly changing,
determinants that include but are not limited to the text’s original public
meaning.
Don’t misunderstand: in emphasizing that what we really care about is
what the law is, and not what the text means, I am not also contending that
this shift in focus plainly resolves the debate in favor of non-originalist approaches or theories, and against Scalian originalism. Most originalists will
think that, if we find ourselves talking about “the grounds of law,” they still
have the better of the debate. Against the non-originalist view of changing
grounds, the originalist may contend that there is only one ground, that
single ground is the original public meaning (“OPM”) of the text, and the
original public meaning is, necessarily, fixed for all time. Originalists may
believe, in short, that the law is the OPM of the text.
At least on the face of things, this is a different type of claim than what
Scalia presses in A Matter of Interpretation. The claim he presses there is a
prescriptive claim about how judges ought to interpret texts. The claim we
are now considering is a constitutive claim about the grounds of our constitutional law. The subject matter of these claims differ: the first concerns how
judges should engage in a particular activity; the second concerns either the
metaphysics of law, or the truthmakers of propositions about law,22 or something similar.
That said, we should not make too much of the difference, for the two
types of claims do seem to go together naturally, the prescriptive claim piggybacking on the constitutive one. According to an originalism that unites
these prescriptive and constitutive strands, judges should enforce the text’s
OPM because the OPM of the text “makes out” (i.e., “determines” or “constitutes”) the law.23 Many originalists in the academy make precisely this
claim,24 and Scalia at least flirts with, and arguably embraces, the view in

22. See Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Truthmakers 4–5 (2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Michigan Law Review).
23. These claims are extricable. Cf. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1823, 1835 (1997) (distinguishing theories of interpretation from theories of
adjudication). One could endorse an originalist constitutive thesis but disavow the prescriptive
thesis, perhaps on the belief that courts should underenforce constitutional norms. Conversely, one could reject the constitutive thesis, perhaps believing that there are no valid constitutional norms, but endorse the originalist prescriptive thesis on the ground that such an
approach best serves democratic values.
24. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 551–52 (1994) (“Originalists do not give priority to the plain
dictionary meaning of the Constitution’s text because they like grammar more than history.
They give priority to it because they believe that it and it alone is law.”); Steven D. Smith,
Reply to Koppelman: Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27 Const. Comment.
189, 193 (2010) (“[O]riginalism insists (with some arguable lapses . . .) that what counts as
law—as valid, enforceable law—is what human beings enact, and that the meaning of that law
is what those human beings understood it to be.”).
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later writings.25 At a minimum, I think it more charitable than not to assume that this is the type of move Scalia would have expressly endorsed had
the issue been squarely posed to him.
I cannot in this Review resolve the dispute between originalism and
non-originalism over the grounds of law. My more limited aim is to show
that, when understood as a constitutive thesis about the grounds of constitutional norms, originalism is far less plausible than might first appear, and
that evolutionary forms of non-originalism are far more plausible than critics, including Scalia, often maintain.
Let’s start with the originalist constitutive thesis. Many people, not only
originalists, find the thesis that the law is whatever the constitutional text
means quite intuitive. Mark Greenberg aptly calls such a view “the Standard
Picture.”26 But many intuitive propositions prove false on inspection, and we
have ample reason to worry about this one. Most fundamentally, it seems
inconsistent with too many constitutional judgments that strike many of us
as correct, even on reflection—judgments including that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the distribution of governmental benefits in an unequal manner regardless of whether the benefits at issue involve or implicate
“protection”; that the federal government is subject to equality-based constraints at least broadly similar to those that the Equal Protection Clause
imposes on the states; that Congress has power to protect the environment
even from harms that do not arise from commerce; that states are constitutionally prohibited from establishing churches; and so forth.27 In fact, I believe that this way of putting the worry understates its force. The problem
for originalism is not only that almost all of us accept some constitutional
propositions that we believe are not licensed by the OPM of the text. It’s also
that we believe that some constitutional judgments are true whether or not
licensed by the OPM of the text. This is why originalists who labor to show
that originalism can deliver Brown v. Board of Education28 are missing some
of the point. Many Americans—lay people and legal elites alike—find it implausible that the correctness of Brown is hostage to a final verdict from
25. In a coauthored book published fifteen years after A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia
asserts that “we are governed not by unexpressed or inadequately expressed ‘legislative goals’
but by the law”; that “the true law is” what an enacted text “state[s]”; and that “it is the text’s
meaning . . . that binds us as law.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 383, 397–98 (2012) (quoting p. 66). Statements such as
these all indicate a constitutive claim. Other passages in the same book, however, strongly
indicate that Scalia continues to understand his project in prescriptive terms, as when he and
Garner insist that the textual-originalist approach they advocate is “unapologetically normative, prescribing what . . . courts ought to do with operative language.” Id. at 9 (emphasis
added). For further reflections on the ambiguity in Scalia’s work regarding whether his claims
are prescriptive, constitutive, or both, see Mitchell N. Berman, Judge Posner’s Simple Law, 113
Mich. L. Rev. 777 (2015) (reviewing Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging (2013)).
26. Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 Oxford Studies in
Philosophy of Law 39, 39–41 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011).
27. For an especially nice discussion, see Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality,
80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1079 (2013).
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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historians of Reconstruction regarding what anybody in 1868 believed or
intended, let alone what some hypothetical reasonable person would have
believed.
To be sure, judicial decisions and extrajudicial judgments that appear
inconsistent with the OPM might not be inconsistent, and those that are
could be mistakes. But we would need good reason to believe that they are
mistakes; we cannot rely upon a mere stipulation that the law is the OPM of
the constitutional text. This is especially true because considered judgments
of the form “Congress has constitutional authority to X,” or “states have a
constitutional duty not to Y,” have epistemic force on any coherentist
epistemology.29
According to the method of reflective equilibrium, we best justify our
beliefs in a range of domains, not by reasoning forward from premises accepted as foundational, but by continually revisiting and adjusting our judgments about diverse propositions in an effort to produce a coherent and
mutually supporting network of beliefs. When applied to ethical judgments,
for example, the method counsels that we seek coherence among our considered judgments about the rightness or wrongness of particular act-tokens
and act-types, midlevel rules or principles, and the even more abstract or
general theoretical considerations or commitments that shape, determine, or
constitute the rules and principles. Of critical importance, no class of judgments is categorically, epistemically privileged over another class of judgments: judgments, say, that this is wrongful and that one should act only in
accordance with that maxim that one may will that it become a universal law
are, in principle, revisable in light of each other, and in light of all other
judgments the agent has or may come to have.
If this model applies to reasoning about constitutional matters,30 then it
is a mistake to believe that we can properly reason only in one direction—
from constitutive accounts of our constitutional norms to judgments about
the constitutionally correct outcomes of particular controversies. The legally
correct resolution of concrete constitutional disputes will result from applying the more general constitutional theory. But our judgments about what is
the correct constitutional theory are themselves answerable to, and informed
by, any considered judgments we may have about the legally correct resolution of concrete constitutional disputes.
For this reason, originalists need good reason to conclude that the OPM
of the constitutional text fully determines our constitutional law. And it’s
very doubtful that originalists have what they need.
To begin with, many of the most familiar arguments for prescriptive
originalism are of much more doubtful relevance, or much weaker force,
29. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Reflective Equilibrium and Constitutional Method:
Lessons from John McCain and the Natural-Born Citizenship Clause, in The Challenge of
Originalism 246 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
30. I grant that the antecedent of this conditional cannot be taken as a given. I believe
that reflective equilibrium is an epistemically appropriate method for reasoning about systems
of practical normativity, but I cannot argue for that here.
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when offered in support of a constitutive thesis. Take Scalia’s fundamental
premise that an originalist interpretive posture would better serve democratic values than would any realistic alternative. That fact, if true, is clearly a
reason (albeit not a conclusive reason) for judges to interpret and enforce
the constitutional text according to its OPM so long as promoting democracy is worthwhile. But many more dots would have to be connected to
explain why a fact about which judicial behavior would be desirable also tells
us something about what the grounds of our law actually are. I cautioned
earlier that we should not make too much of the distinction between
originalism as a prescriptive thesis about how judges should interpret texts
(the thesis that Scalia explicitly defends in A Matter of Interpretation) and
originalism as a constitutive thesis about what the grounds of our constitutional norms are (the type of thesis that Scalia seems to need once we distinguish, as he himself did not, among text, meaning, and law). My point here
is that we shouldn’t make too little of the difference either. The truth of the
constitutive thesis would be a weighty reason in favor of the prescriptive
thesis. But few arguments for the prescriptive thesis that do not contain the
truth of the constitutive thesis as a premise will weigh heavily in favor of the
constitutive thesis itself.
The most persuasive arguments for the constitutive thesis will have to
connect closely, I think, to general jurisprudential claims about the nature of
law, broadly understood. As I’ll explain, originalists could defend the position that the law is the OPM of the text as either a universal thesis or a
parochial one.31 But neither route looks very promising.
As a universal thesis, the law is the OPM of the text maintains, roughly,
that it is a general truth about law that, in any legal system that contains
authoritative legal texts, the law is fully determined or constituted by the
OPM of those texts. This is a claim about law at what Mark Greenberg has
usefully described as its “most fundamental level.”32 Such a claim is hard to
swallow. First, the apparent empirical counterexamples now explode in
number. A defender of this thesis must explain away all putatively correct
legal propositions from every legal system, from any place and any time, that
depart from the OPM of an applicable authoritative legal text. Second, although the “standard picture” may be part of the implicit package of beliefs
for most of us, including for many legal scholars and elites,33 it gains no
support from any well-developed, general jurisprudential theory I know of.
For both these reasons, the universal approach is exceedingly doubtful.
Understood, instead, as a parochial thesis, the law is the OPM of the text
would be true of our constitutional law not because that is a legal truth at
31. The universal–parochial distinction roughly tracks the Austinian distinction between
“general” and “particular” jurisprudence. See William Twinning, Globalisation and Legal Theory 21–23 (2000). Although that latter distinction is familiar, it is also ambiguous,
which is why I prefer my less familiar terms.
32. Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory, the Dependence View, and Natural Law,
in The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence (George Duke & Robert
George eds., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4) (on file with Michigan Law Review).
33. Id. (manuscript at 3).
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the most fundamental level, but because it is made true by whatever is true
at the most fundamental level married to the contingent facts about our
constitutional order that the fundamental level makes relevant. To take a
cartoon illustration, suppose that it is a universal jurisprudential truth that
the law of a community consists of whatever set of norms would best promote aggregate community utility. That would be a truth about law “at its
most fundamental level.” If it were also true that, in our legal system, legal
norms that corresponded to the OPM of the constitutional text best promote aggregate utility among members of our polity, then the law is the
OPM of the text would be true of our constitutional order, at a contingent
and derivative level. That, as I say, is a fanciful example designed only to
illustrate the structure of the argument. The question is whether a
nonfanciful argument to the same conclusion is in the cards.
Believers in Scalian originalism would have to think so, but they frequently underestimate the steepness of the argumentative hill they must
climb. Very probably, the dominant view in the American legal academy is
broadly Hartian. On the standard reading of H.L.A. Hart’s theory of law, the
law is the set of norms that are ultimately grounded in a convergent practice
of legal officials, especially judges.34 On that view of law at its most fundamental level, the law is the OPM of the text is true of our constitutional
system if and only if American judges converge on a practice of recognizing
that as so. But the many seemingly non-originalist constitutional decisions
alluded to earlier make this highly unlikely. And even Scalia has acknowledged that we have never had a consistently originalist judiciary.35 Not surprisingly then, most commentators who have expressly addressed the issue
have concluded that the U.S. rule of recognition is non-originalist.36
In sum, if the law is the OPM of the text is a truth about the determinants of our constitutional norms, we are vastly far from having it established. At the same time, if the case for constitutive originalism weakens the
harder one thinks about its jurisprudential underpinnings, matters are precisely the reverse for the non-originalist constitutive thesis that the law is the
inescapably dynamic product of various factors that are themselves changing
and incapable of being fixed.
34. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3d ed. 2012). For the view that
this common reading of Hart gets him wrong, see Kevin Toh, Hart’s Expressivism and His
Benthamite Project, 11 Legal Theory 75, 77 (2005).
35. Scalia, supra note 18, at 852.
36. See the chapters, especially those by Kent Greenawalt and Richard H. Fallon, Jr., in
The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar
Himma eds., 2009). Will Baude has recently argued that “our current constitutional practices
demonstrate a commitment to” an interpretive approach that he dubs “inclusive originalism.”
William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349, 2349 (2015). I am
unpersuaded, mostly because, with Richard Primus, I believe that Baude is too quick to accept
judicial rhetoric as judicial reasoning. See Richard Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?, 116
Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 44 (2016). In any event, as Baude makes entirely clear, his “inclusive
originalism” differs significantly from Scalian originalism; it does not maintain that the law is
the OPM of the text. See Baude, supra, at 2355 (distinguishing between “exclusive originalism”
and “inclusive originalism”).
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That thesis strikes many as mysterious or dubious at first blush. Scalia
ridicules the notion that “what the Constitution [required] yesterday it does
not necessarily [require] today.”37 But the gibe loses its sting once two broad
types of change are distinguished: abrupt or purposive change and gradual,
organic, or evolutionary change. Non-originalists tend to believe that law
changes in an organic or evolutionary way. That is how most social phenomena change. Mores, fashion, the use of money, market prices, word
meanings, rules of prescriptive grammar, etiquette, games, religion—all are
“the result of human action, but not of human design. They are evolutionary
phenomena, in the original meaning of the word—they unfold.”38 To suppose that law changes in a similar way is hardly audacious. That seems like a
pretty apt description of the common law after all. Of course, as Scalia emphasizes in A Matter of Interpretation, statutory and constitutional law are
different from the common law. But it’s still arresting to contend that all
legal norms that have a textual basis are wholly resistant to evolutionary or
organic change.
Maybe they are. I don’t think so, but that’s an argument for another
day. For today, it’s enough to note that if our surface-level constitutional
norms do rest upon, or are constituted by, “grounds of law” subject to evolutionary change—“gradual, incremental, undirected, emergent and driven
by natural selection among competing ideas”39—Scalia would reap at least
one benefit. He wouldn’t have to struggle against his “faint-hearted” disposition to abandon originalism when it yielded results too offensive to broadly
held, contemporary moral judgments.40 If there is any evolutionary component to the grounding of our constitutional norms, then the only plausible
forms of originalism will be fainthearted.
Against this, recall Scalia’s exchange with Ted Olson, attorney for the
plaintiffs, in the oral argument for Hollingsworth v. Perry,41 the preObergefell42 case that considered the constitutionality of state laws that refuse
to recognize same-sex marriage.
JUSTICE SCALIA: . . . . [W]hen did it become unconstitutional to exclude
homosexual couples from marriage? 1791? 1868 . . . ?
....
37. Pp. 39–40. I have replaced “meant” and “mean” with “required” and “require” to
shift the focus where, for non-originalists, it belongs: on legal norms rather than textual
meaning.
38. Matt Ridley, The Evolution of Everything: How New Ideas Emerge 4 (2015).
As already noted, theorists of tragedy clearly believe this is true of their subject matter. See
supra note 8 and accompanying text.
39. Ridley, supra note 38, at 2.
40. Scalia fessed him faintheartedness in Originalism: The Lesser Evil. Scalia, supra note
18, at 864. He later backtracked in Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. Mag.
(Oct. 6, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/ [https://perma.cc/
5XYN-KXSG].
41. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
42. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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MR. OLSON: There’s no specific date in time. This is an evolutionary
cycle.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, how am I supposed to know how to decide a case,
then . . . if you can’t give me a date when the Constitution changes?
....
JUSTICE SCALIA: It seems to me that you ought to be able to tell me
when. Otherwise, I don’t know how to decide the case.43

Put aside the particular issue of same-sex marriage. The general thrust
of Olson’s response looks right to me. But if it’s wrong, that’s not for any
reason that Scalia gives. Consider an analogy. Nobody denies that word
meanings change over time. As Scalia has noted, the word “artificial” meant
“highly artistic” in the early eighteenth century.44 One of its primary meanings today is “contrived or arbitrary.”45 So imagine somebody objecting (in
parity with Scalia’s Hollingsworth objection) that she does not “know how to
use ‘artificial’ in a sentence” or “how to line-edit a student’s paper,” unless
told “when ‘artificial’ changed its meaning.” That seems absurd, no? So it is
in the legal case too. All we usually need to know is that it (the meaning of a
word, the content of our law) has changed; we rarely need to know, in addition, when it changed.46
The key upshot here is not that originalism is wrong and non-originalism is right. My more modest claim is that Scalia’s arguments in A Matter of
Interpretation fall far short of their mark. Scalia can’t establish that living
constitutionalism is misguided so long as he attributes to his opponents a
view of constitutional interpretation that they do not endorse, and so long
as he overlooks views in the vicinity that are more plausible.
B. Statutory Interpretation
A similar failure to recognize a range of conceptual, or even ontological,
distinctions also besets Scalia’s arguments on statutory interpretation,
though my discussion must be brief.47
Recall that, according to Scalia, statutory interpreters face a choice between following what the legislature “said” and what it “intended” (p. 16). A
textualist maintains that judges should attend to only what the words in the
statutory text mean (pp. 22–23). A non-textualist maintains that judges
should attend, instead or in addition, to what the legislature intended. Scalia
seems to assume that what the non-textualist has in mind is transparent. But
43. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37–41, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (No. 12-144).
44. Scalia & Garner, supra note 25, at 78.
45. Artificial, The American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011).
46. True, if you can’t know just when it changed, then you can’t (always) know just what
the law is. So what? The consequent is true: you can’t (always) know just what the law is.
47. Jonah Gelbach and I elaborate on this line of argument. Mitchell N. Berman & Jonah
B. Gelbach, Legal Intention: Between Text and Purpose (Nov. 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Michigan Law Review).

April 2017]

The Tragedy of Justice Scalia

797

it isn’t. One who advocates that judges should pay attention to “what the
legislature intended,” and not only to what the statutory words mean, could
herself intend to be contrasting what the words in the statute mean with any
of the following things: (1) the meanings of the words that the legislature
intended to utter; (2) the meanings that the legislature intended that the
words in the statutory text would convey; (3) the meanings that the legislature intended to communicate by means of its utterance; (4) the legal
changes that the legislature intended to effectuate by means of enacting the
statute; or (5) the consequences in the world that the legislature intended to
realize by means of changing the law.
Let me explicate these varied types or objects of legislative intent with
examples.48 I’ll then explain why these distinctions matter.
1. Suppose that a statutory provision declares that “the winning party
must pay the other side’s reasonable attorney fees,” but that the legislature
intended to write “losing” instead of “winning.”49 One who believes that the
meaning of the compound phrase “losing party” should govern might argue
that judges should follow, not the meanings of the words in the statute, but
the meanings of the words that the legislature intended to utter. This principle
addresses the problem of misspeaking, or of scrivener’s error.
2. Imagine now that a statutory provision declares that “applications
are due at 12 a.m.,” and that the legislative drafters thought, erroneously,
that “12 a.m.” means noon. One who believes that judges should interpret
the statute to require applications by noon might argue that judges should
follow, not the meanings of the words in the statute, but the meanings that
the legislature intended that the words in the statutory text would convey.
Whereas the first intentionalist principle addresses linguistic accidents, this
second principle addresses linguistic mistakes.50
3. Recall an example I introduced earlier: a statutory provision that
reads “children under twelve may enter free.”51 None of the words in this
provision, singly or collectively, mean that persons not “under twelve” must
pay. Very probably, however, the legislature intended to communicate that
negative implication. In philosophical jargon, the idea that persons twelve
and over must pay is a “pragmatic implicature”52 of the utterance, but is not
encoded in the meanings of the words. One who believes that this pragmatic
implicature should be respected might argue that judges should follow, not
48. Throughout this Section I will be bracketing worries about what it is for a legislature,
as a collective body, to have an intention of any type. In doing so, I don’t mean to suggest that
such worries are trivial. They are not. But addressing them would consume more space than I
can afford, especially given that the specific problem of collective intentions is not one that
Scalia presses. The nature of collective intention is mostly orthogonal to the topic at hand,
which is the variety of objects of intention.
49. The example is from Scalia & Garner, supra note 25, at 235.
50. For the classic discussion of the difference, see J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses: The
Presidential Address, Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y, June 1957, at 1.
51. See p. 25; supra text following note 14.
52. See H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 Syntax and Semantics: Speech Acts
41, 41–58 (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).

798

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 115:783

the meanings of the words in the statute, but the meanings that the legislature
intended to communicate by means of its utterance.
4. A legislature enacts a statute intending that by so doing it will
change the law. But it does not intend merely that the law be changed; it
intends that the law be changed in thus-and-such a manner—that is, to create
a legal power to X, to expand the legal right to Y, and so forth. Sometimes,
however, the meaning that the enacted text communicates fails to reflect the
legal change that the legislature intended to effectuate (its “legal intentions”), not due to a linguistic accident or mistake (cases 1 and 2), but due
to what, for want of a better term, we might call a “statutory design defect.”
Maybe, for example, the legislature (or its drafting agents) failed to understand how separate parts of a complex statute would mesh,53 or failed to
account for an interpretive canon employed by the courts. One who believes
that a legislature’s legal intentions are deserving of respect (perhaps on democratic grounds) might argue that judges should follow, not the meanings of
the words in the statute, but the legal changes that the legislature intended to
effectuate by means of enacting the statute.
5. Let us extend the previous case. When a legislature enacts a statute
in order to effectuate a legal change, it does so with the further intent (commonly called a “purpose”) that the legal change thereby effectuated (a new
legal power, a more stringent legal duty, etc.) will help bring about some
desired consequence in the world (a reduction in car accidents, an improvement in maternal health, etc.). Sometimes, however, the practical results
aimed at do not materialize, not due to a linguistic accident or mistake, or to
a statutory design defect, but due to erroneous empirical assumptions or
predictions. One who believes that courts should help legislatures achieve
their practical objectives might argue that judges should follow, not the
meanings of the words in the statute, but the consequences in the world that
the legislature intended to realize by means of changing the law.
In sum, there is no one thing that someone who advocates attention to
legislative intention, in contrast to the meanings of the words in the statutory text, must be recommending. Yet Scalia does not recognize any of these
differences. As it happens, Scalia would approve departures from what the
words of the statute mean in cases 1 and 3: he allows for a limited doctrine
of scrivener’s error,54 and he accepts that the textualist should at least sometimes attend to the pragmatic meaning of a statutory text and not only its
semantic meaning.55 But his position on case 2 (concerning linguistic mistakes) is not entirely clear,56 and he unequivocally rejects departures in cases
53. See Richard Primus, The Cost of the Text, 102 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 7–9) (on file with Michigan Law Review); cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,
2492–93 (2015).
54. Scalia & Garner, supra note 25, at 234–35.
55. The expressio unius canon is, as Scalia notes, “so commonsensical” (pp. 25–26) precisely because what a text communicates is not reducible to what its words mean.
56. For a case (from early in his tenure on the Court) in which Scalia arguably privileges
the meaning that the legislature intended that the words of the statutory text would convey
(case 2) over the meaning of the words in the text, see Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490
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4 and 5—those involving legal intentions, or extralegal purposes.57 Maybe
his positions are optimal, all things considered. I express no view on that
issue here. My point is only that he is unable to marshal effective arguments
on this score so long as he overlooks possibly relevant distinctions and instead lumps a diversity of types of intent into a single legislative-intent bogeyman. For example, one of his principal arguments against intentionalism
is that judges may not be competent to discover and enforce “the broad
social purposes” behind legislation, and should not have the authority to do
so (p. 23), in part because there may be no agreement about them. This is a
reason why judges should not seek to effectuate extralegal purposes (case 5).
It is not a reason why judges should not seek to correct “linguistic mistakes”
(case 2) or to effectuate “legal intentions” (case 4).
III. Scalia’s Greatness
Dramatic tragedy requires a tragic hero—tragic in virtue of his flaws
and the calamity they usher forth, and heroic in virtue of the nobility of his
character or the greatness of his deeds. Yet I have just argued that the chain
of reasoning that Scalia relies upon in A Matter of Interpretation for his theories of statutory and constitutional interpretation is deeply flawed. If I am
right, then in what does Scalia’s greatness lie?
Not in his considerable personal warmth or in his dazzling prose.
Though the first is admirable and the second enviable, they don’t add up to
what tragedy requires. Nor does he earn his wings, so to speak, on the
strength of the legal or moral merits of the legal doctrines he crafted or the
rulings he helped to produce or to frustrate. We’d all assign credits and
debits differently on this particular ledger. But the tragic hero’s greatness
must be visible to all of us, not something that depends on each scorer’s
final tally. Scalia’s greatness does not reside in his doctrinal legacy; it resides
in his jurisprudential one.
Recall my suggestion that we separate the critical and constructive
strands of the positions advanced in A Matter of Interpretation. I will put
aside the latter. My own view is that Scalia’s strong form of originalism (in

U.S. 504, 527–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (interpreting a statutory provision that referenced “defendant” to apply only to a “criminal defendant”).
57. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 455 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“It may be unlikely that this is what Congress actually had in
mind; but it is what Congress said, it is not so absurd as to be an obvious mistake, and it is
therefore the law.”). Consistent with Bock Laundry, my colleague Ryan Doerfler has suggested
that Scalia’s position on statutory interpretation was that judges should privilege objectified
(legislative) communicative intentions over both actual communicative intentions and noncommunicative intentions, whether actual or objectified. I believe that is probably right as a
matter of Scalia exegesis. I’m suggesting here only that the details of his position are not made
clear in A Matter of Interpretation, and that his argumentation is hampered by excessive
lumping.
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either prescriptive or constitutive variants) is, not merely unpersuasively defended, but substantively mistaken.58 And I am not competent to say very
much about his textualism.59 Nonetheless, Scalia’s critical or negative interventions are themselves contributions of the first order even if (as I admit
not to have established) his affirmative theses regarding statutory and constitutional interpretation are ultimately indefensible.
Scalia was far from the first to charge justices of the Warren and Burger
Courts with fundamental failures of judicial craft. Conservative critics of
“judicial activism,” notably including Scalia’s fellow originalist Robert
Bork,60 had long been beating that drum. In fairness, political liberals had
too, from Herbert Wechsler’s questioning of Brown61 to John Hart Ely’s takedown of Roe.62 But Scalia pressed the objection with rare urgency, energy,
argumentative depth, and rhetorical power. The complaint was not formulated in terms of judicial restraint—it was that judges need, but lacked, a
self-conscious and defensible account of how they should engage with authoritative legal texts formally promulgated by other governmental actors
(pp. 10–14). “The Constitution . . . even though a democratically adopted
text, we formally treat like the common law. What, it is fair to ask, is the
justification for doing so?” (p. 40).
That is a fair question to ask. It is more than fair; it is compelling. To be
sure, as Richard Posner has observed, judges can “decide a case without a
theory of how to decide it correctly.”63 Not only can they, if they don’t have
a theory but do have a case, then they must. But that is a happy state of
affairs only so long as current practices are generally thought to be in good
order, and Scalia, among others, raised doubts more than sufficient to require a response.
Of course, responses have been made, including a defense of the common law constitutionalism that Scalia thought patently unacceptable.64 But
any advances in non-originalist constitutional theory that the Scalia-fueled
58. For some arguments, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1, 37–93 (2009). I should emphasize here, as I do there, see id. at 21–24, that I am addressing
only those forms of originalism—notably including Scalia’s—that treat an original object as
(with the most limited of exceptions) either the sole target of constitutional interpretation or
the sole ground of constitutional norms. I am entirely open to more moderate forms and am
encouraged by their recent growth.
59. For whatever it’s worth, I think it generally accepted that Scalia’s textualism has been
significantly more influential in practice than has his originalism.
60. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J.
1, 1–7 (1971).
61. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 31–35 (1959).
62. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale
L.J. 920, 937–40 (1973).
63. Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 519,
539 (2012).
64. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution (2010).
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explosion in originalist thinking has provoked do not undermine the importance of Scalia’s critical charge. They vindicate it. So too, of course, do any
improvements to originalist theory that have arisen in response to Scalia’s
own efforts. Scalia, more than any other figure, inspired a generation of
lawyers (and not only conservatives) to take seriously the demand that
judges account for how they decide statutory and constitutional cases. In the
eyes of some, the constitutional philosophy of the liberal icon Justice William Brennan looked like one part “human dignity”65 married to another
part “counting to five.”66 Scalia insisted that wasn’t near good enough. He
was right. And he deserves acclaim for forcing us to see it.
IV. Scalia’s Tragic Flaws
If the greatness of Scalia’s contributions to American jurisprudence lies
chiefly in the cogency and importance of the challenge he posed, his tragic
flaws start with his dogmatic insistence that he alone could meet it. Hubris
was the central tragic flaw for the Greeks. Similarly, for Hegel, “[t]ragedy
arises . . . when a hero courageously asserts a substantial and just position . . . and so falls prey to a one-sidedness that is defined at one and the
same time by greatness and by guilt.”67 Scalia was self-confident and onesided to a fault. He had an unequalled capacity to announce clarity where
others saw murkiness and ambiguity. That’s admirable when it results from
exceptional discernment. It’s deplorable when it results from undue certitude. Throughout his judicial and extrajudicial writings, Scalia made claims
for his view, and about opposing views, that were wholly out of proportion
to the warrant he had for believing them.
These faults make occasional appearances in A Matter of Interpretation.
Return, for example, to my parsing of Scalia’s arguments for both his textualism and his originalism.68 The third premise in each argument (what I’ve
designated (T3) and (O3)) are pretty obviously caricatures. That’s not a
solid foundation on which to construct an argument. And is it really true
that “the Due Process Clause quite obviously does not bear [a substantive]
interpretation” (p. 24)—even though the phrase “due process of law” had
often been used as a synonym for “the law of the land”?69 Moreover, if the
Due Process Clause is “inescapabl[y]” limited to process (p. 24), shouldn’t
the Equal Protection Clause be inescapably limited to protection? I could
offer additional examples, but most would be quibbles. Overall, as Jeffrey
65. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium (October 12, 1985), in Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate 55 (Steven G. Calabresi ed.,
2007).
66. See Rory K. Little, Reading Justice Brennan: Is There a “Right” to Dissent?, 50 Hastings L.J. 683, 685 (1999).
67. Mark W. Roche, The Greatness and Limits of Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy, in A Companion to Tragedy, supra note 8, at 51, 51.
68. See supra Part I.
69. Comment by Gordon S. Wood, p. 57.
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Rosen aptly observed in a contemporaneous review of A Matter of Interpretation, “As a literary performance, Scalia’s lecture shows him in uncharacteristically good temper.”70
It is an unhappy fact that Scalia’s temper was often worse, or his vices
more on display, in his judicial opinions. This is a hard claim to establish in
a short essay. Scalia authored nearly 1,000 opinions yet I have space for only
a few examples. If I am necessarily left open to a charge of cherry-picking,71 I
might as well pick the plumpest: Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller,72 which held that the Second Amendment constitutionalizes
a preexisting common law right to possess a handgun for self-defense.
Maybe Scalia is right on the history, maybe not. Reasonable people disagree.
What seems entirely unreasonable is the strength of Scalia’s conclusion:
“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the
Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms”
unrelated to militia service.73 This is hard to buy. My reading of the literature suggests that most professional historians who have examined the issue
disagree with Heller’s bottom-line conclusion and that Justice Alito surely
had things closer to right when acknowledging, two years after Heller, that
“there is certainly room for disagreement about Heller’s analysis of the history of the right to keep and bear arms.”74 If Scalia really had “no doubt”
about the state of the evidence, that says more about him than it does about
the historical record.
In a similar spirit, can Scalia really be right, as he asserted in his lone
VMI dissent, that “it is entirely clear” that the Constitution allows a state to
provide an all-male college without providing any all-female alternative?75
That is a striking assertion given that none of his fellow justices, and nobody
on the appellate panel, saw things that way. And one would think the picture
is at least somewhat murky even for an originalist. Steven Calabresi, who
shares Scalia’s starting “premise that originalists ought to begin and end all
analysis with the original public meaning of constitutional texts,”76 has concluded that VMI was rightly decided because the original meaning was understood to effectuate “a ban on all systems of caste.”77
70. Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin, New Republic (May 5, 1997), https://newrepublic
.com/article/74152/originalist-sin [https://perma.cc/QL2C-CKMX].
71. But, really, I shouldn’t be. A linguistic analysis of opinions of the Roberts Court
through 2010 found that Scalia exhibited the highest level of certainty of the ten justices included. This was true for his majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents. Frank B. Cross &
James W. Pennebaker, The Language of the Roberts Court, 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 853, 889 &
tbl.2.
72. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
73. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
74. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 788 (2010).
75. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 Tex. L.
Rev. 1, 4 (2011).
77. Id. at 27.
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Or consider one of my personal favorites: Scalia’s dissent, for himself
and Justice Clarence Thomas, in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin.78 The case raised
two questions: whether the Americans with Disabilities Act covers the PGA
Tour; and if so, whether waiving the rule that golfers walk between holes for
a golfer with a degenerative circulatory disorder would effect a “fundamental alteration” of the activity.79 The Court answered the first affirmatively
and the second negatively.80 Scalia disagreed on both counts.81 In my view,
his bottom-line positions on both issues were plausible, possibly persuasive.
But he didn’t stop there, insisting “it is the very nature of a game to have no
object except amusement,” and that, for this reason, all rules of all games
“are arbitrary and none is essential.”82 These claims are not merely false,
they are foolish. Games, as a class, have a rich multiplicity of objects—not
only amusement, but providing exercise, honing mental and physical skills,
developing virtues of honesty, fair-dealing, teamwork, and resilience, and so
on. It’s hard to figure how he could have missed this. Furthermore, Scalia’s
second claim would be false even were the first one true. “Arbitrary” means
ungoverned by reason, governed by whim or caprice.83 So long as games
have even the single object of being amusing, then the choice of rules is
governed by reason—namely, how well it promotes amusement.
Because these missteps result in the sort of mindless pronouncements
that Scalia would have savaged had they issued from Justice Kennedy’s pen, I
have found myself wondering what explains them. My own guess is that
when he says that all rules of all games “are arbitrary and none is essential”84
he’s really thinking something along the lines of “all rules of all games are
arbitrary because none is essential”—a frame of mind that reflects a discomfort in the broad expanse of life and law where things are neither essential
nor arbitrary, where reasoned judgment must reign. In one of his final opinions after nearly thirty-five years on the Supreme Court, Justice John Paul
Stevens observed that the practice of judicial review, especially in
unenumerated rights cases, “depends on judges’ exercising careful, reasoned
judgment. As it always has, and as it always will.”85 One cannot imagine
Scalia voicing a similar thought. That’s a shame.
Hubris, overconfidence, arrogance, dogmatism—these constitute one
cluster of vices. They do not entail that the possessor of such defects of
character be sarcastic, caustic, or disrespectful of others. Regrettably, however, Scalia fell victim to these vices too. This is very well-worn ground.
78. 532 U.S. 661, 691–705 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 664–65, 682 (majority opinion).
80. Id. at 681, 683.
81. Id. at 691, 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 700–01.
83. See Arbitrary, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (3d ed. 2002).
84. PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 701 (emphasis added).
85. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 911 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Whole articles have been written on the topic.86 Here’s a sampler: Scalia
opined that the majority’s arguments in one abortion case “cannot be taken
seriously,”87 and that the Court’s conclusion in another rested not on “reasoned judgment” but “only personal predilection.”88 He asserted that the
holding of one gay rights case “has no foundation in American constitutional law, and barely pretends to.”89 He derided a second as rife with
“mummeries and straining-to-be-memorable passages” and “couched in a
style that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic.”90 He disparaged a free
exercise decision as “nothing short of ludicrous” and “beyond the absurd,”91
an Eighth Amendment decision as resting “obviously upon nothing but the
personal views of its Members,”92 and a Fourth Amendment case as
“serv[ing] up a freedom-destroying cocktail consisting of two parts patent
falsity.”93 Examples could be multiplied with ease.
This is not okay. One state appellate judge issued a verdict that, in my
judgment, can hardly be improved upon:
Whatever one thinks of [Scalia’s] intellectual prowess, his writing skill, his
jurisprudence generally, and his theory of “originalism,” his written decisions provide a case study of how not to act in the legal arena.
His written decisions are lacking in humility and punctuated with
mean-spirited, personal and sarcastic language. In a culture where basic
norms of civility and courtesy are breaking down before our very eyes,
Scalia’s use of insulting rhetoric, vitriolic personal put-downs and puerile
cheap shots in his written decisions was lamentable, to say the least. If there
is one venue left where society is entitled to reasoned, respectful debate—
not the sort of testosterone-laced toxic exchanges which increasingly characterize discourse in society at large—it is the judicial arena.94

86. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal,
22 U. Haw. L. Rev. 385 (2000); Marie A. Failinger, Not Mere Rhetoric: On Wasting or Claiming
Your Legacy, Justice Scalia, 34 U. Toledo L. Rev. 425 (2003); Stephen A. Newman, Political
Advocacy on the Supreme Court: The Damaging Rhetoric of Antonin Scalia, 51 N.Y. L. Sch. L.
Rev. 907 (2007).
87. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
88. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628, 2630 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 637–38 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1697 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. Douglas S. Lavine, Scalia Provided Example of How Not to Practice, Nat’l L.J., May
16, 2016, at 10. Retired Justice Lewis Powell had worried about precisely this early in Scalia’s
tenure on the Court. See Biskupic, supra note 1, at 195.
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As Gil Seinfeld, a former Scalia clerk, pithily concluded, “The manner in
which Justice Scalia chose to express himself publicly under conditions of
sharp disagreement is dismaying, and it is a blot upon his legacy.”95
It is frankly disappointing that conservative defenders of civil public discourse so routinely give Scalia a free pass on this score. Some of Scalia’s
champions deny that he so much as ratcheted up the rhetoric.96 A few acknowledge that Scalia was unduly caustic, but criticize him only on the narrowly instrumental ground that his dismissive language might have impeded
his ability to cobble together a majority.97 That may be true, but it truly
misses the point: Scalia’s frequently nasty tone and rhetoric degrades the
quality of public discourse and, by “characteriz[ing] majority decisions of
the Court as not just wrong, but without principle,” tends “to undermine
the essential integrity and legitimacy of the Court’s work.”98
The dogmatism and incivility that Scalia displayed throughout his career
are, in my judgment, two very serious defects of judicial character. But there
was a third. To illustrate it, I will finish this Part where so many critical
analyses of Scalia’s jurisprudence start—with affirmative action.
On one hand, by all accounts, Scalia’s commitment to a political principle of color blindness ran deep in his bones. On the other, affirmative action
represents precisely the sort of highly controversial social issue that most
forcefully implicates his central jurisprudential thesis that judges must let
the people work it out unless the OPM of the text clearly takes the issue out
of the democratic realm. Because color blindness is no obvious part of the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s declaration that no state shall
deny any person “the equal protection of the laws,”99 one would have hoped
that the apparent conflict between these two commitments would have
driven Scalia in one of two directions: (1) to seriously investigate the history
surrounding the Equal Protection Clause and to be willing to uphold racebased affirmative action if the results of the investigation did not deliver a
persuasive conclusion that color blindness was part of the clause’s original
public meaning; or (2) to forthrightly embrace a constitutional principle of
color blindness despite the unhelpful state of the historical record and to
modify his official interpretive approach by leavening strict adherence to the
OPM with a dose of justice. Scalia opted for neither of the above. Instead, he
95. Gil Seinfeld, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Reflections of a Counterclerk, 114 Mich.
L. Rev. First Impressions 111, 120–21 (2016), http://michiganlawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/114MichLRevFI111_Seinfeld.pdf [https://perma.cc/P37A-DK3A].
96. See, e.g., Calabresi & Braga, supra note 6, at 823–31 (seeing no meaningful difference
between Scalia’s language and “heated dissents” authored by Story, Holmes, and Curtis). I
encourage anyone who is uncertain who has the better of this little debate to read the opinions
that Calabresi and Braga cite.
97. See, e.g., George F. Will, Why Antonin Scalia Was a Jurist of Colossal Consequence,
Wash. Post (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-antonin-scaliawas-a-jurist-of-colossal-consequence/2016/02/14/6936b8fc-d359-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_sto
ry.html [https://perma.cc/5T62-XLBX].
98. Newman, supra note 86, at 916.
99. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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simply insisted that a principle of color blindness is encoded in the OPM of
the Equal Protection Clause, and he did so without bothering to undertake
even a rudimentary historical inquiry.100 And that’s to say nothing about the
utter implausibility of the idea that the OPM of any portion of the constitutional text imposes a norm of color blindness against the federal
government.
Please understand that the issue is not, exactly, whether an originalist
case could possibly be made for color blindness. It’s whether Scalia had
made the case, or even tried to. His commitment to democracy, as he understood it, dictated that the burden falls on those challenging the action of the
politically accountable branches.101 Courts have no license to hold legislative
or executive action unconstitutional unless persuaded that it runs afoul of
the OPM of some portion of the constitutional text. Scalia declared himself
persuaded that affirmative action did so, but he had no remotely adequate
basis for his confidence. It looks a darn sight closer to fiat than to reason.102
Here’s Seinfeld’s conclusion:
To me, at least, this is gravely disappointing, and it gives the lie to those
who regard the Justice as an unfailing champion of adjudicative rectitude.
....
The affirmative action cases presented a real opportunity for legal
principle to strut its stuff. Imagine how strong a statement Justice Scalia
would have made about the importance of the rule of law, and about the
need to adhere to one’s theory of constitutional interpretation even when
one doesn’t like the result, if he had published opinions saying that he
thought affirmative action terribly misguided, yet still permissible in light
of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. He chose not
to make that statement, and our constitutional discourse is weaker for it.103
100. See Berman, supra note 25, at 796.
101. See pp. 17–23.
102. For elaboration, see Berman, supra note 25, at 795–98. Many originalist scholars
candidly acknowledge that Scalia did not do the historical homework that his professed
originalism requires. But even among those who do, many or most substantially understate
that fact’s significance. For example, in the course of offering the most substantial originalmeaning argument for color blindness yet produced, Michael Rappaport forthrightly grants
that Justices Scalia and Thomas together “have not made any real effort to justify their affirmative action opinions based on the Constitution’s original meaning. Instead, their decisions
have relied on a combination of precedent, moral claims, and legal principles.” Michael B.
Rappaport, Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 71, 73
(2013). But he then concludes, on the strength of his measured assessment that his own novel
arguments make out a “reasonable” case “that state government affirmative action is unconstitutional,” that “the originalist Justices are therefore not being inconsistent or hypocritical by
supporting a colorblind Constitution.” Id. at 72–73. I believe that Rappaport is drawing the
wrong conclusion. The right conclusion (assuming the premises) is, at best, that the originalist
justices are not mistaken in supporting a colorblind Constitution. By exercising judicial power
to override decisions made by democratically accountable actors, without the epistemic warrant their theories demand, their behavior would still be “inconsistent or hypocritical.” Id.
103. Seinfeld, supra note 95, at 120.

April 2017]

The Tragedy of Justice Scalia

807

Many critics have objected that Scalia’s performance in the affirmative
action context unmasks him as a partisan, result-oriented justice.104 They
argue that Scalia simply would not follow his prescribed methodology when
its conclusions were too distasteful for him, notwithstanding his disavowal
of faintheartedness.105 His most stalwart defenders deny the charge categorically.106 They find the suggestion that Scalia would have willfully violated his
principles fantastic.107 I’m willing to grant the benefit of the doubt. But that
would not be enough to salvage Scalia’s reasoning on affirmative action. As I
have just tried to show, his performance on the topic was unacceptable
whether or not a persuasive originalist case for color blindness lurks in the
wild still waiting to be bagged (or whether color blindness is part of our
constitutional order on non-originalist grounds). If Scalia’s supporters are
right, that would just go to show, I think, that it’s not that Scalia wouldn’t
walk the walk, but that he couldn’t. For me, this rings true. All of us must
know that the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action presents at
least a “difficulty” or a “challenge” for originalist conservatives. None of us
thinks that the originalist case for color blindness is a lay-down. All the
same, I’d venture, none of us could have envisioned Scalia coming out any
differently than he did.
And so we arrive at Scalia’s third and final flaw: the inability to perform
as one knows one ought. As tragic flaws go, it’s a peculiarly modern one, for
it manifests the essence of tragedy in our time: “[A]n exposition of man’s
powerlessness in his cosmic setting.”108
V. Calamity
I have just discussed Scalia’s flaws or vices as a jurist. The Greek word
often translated as tragic flaw is hamartia. Although its full meaning is controversial, it is widely understood to denote not only a flaw, defect, vice, or
error, but one that drives the action to its calamitous end.109 Can disaster be
fairly laid at Scalia’s feet?
Not yet, at least. I have already said, repeating many others, that Scalia’s
absolutism and dismissive rhetoric threaten our legal and political culture by
hardening divisions and encouraging disrespect, even disdain, for our judiciary. These are genuine dangers and they threaten grave harm. But to proclaim that Scalia has brought forth disaster does appear rather hysterical.
That is good. I’m not committed to pressing the “tragedy” theme all the way
home.
104. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 198–99 (2013).
105. See, e.g., id. at 215–19.
106. E.g., Calabresi & Braga, supra note 6, at 804–06.
107. See, e.g., id. at 804–05.
108. Leech, supra note 8, at 16.
109. See Geoffrey Brereton, Principles of Tragedy: A Rational Examination of
the Tragic Concept in Life and Literature 39–40 (1968).
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If we do not yet have a full-blown tragedy, though, we have seen enough
to make out the lesson I promised. Tragedy, Aristotle taught, arises “because
the world is full of actors not only with clashing ethical perspectives, but
with strong, unyielding commitments to them.”110 We can see where we are
heading, and we have time to turn back. Clashing ethical perspectives are
here to stay. It’s the “unyielding commitments” that must yield. And we
should hope they yield soon, for norms of civic engagement evolve in ways
that none of us can control, though many of us can influence. (Like social
phenomena generally, one might think.111)
No side has entirely clean hands when it comes to the character of our
constitutional and jurisprudential debates. Liberals too often charge conservative jurists with being morally insensitive or odious, even when those
jurists may well be operating in good faith from plausible jurisprudential
accounts that rule certain moral considerations legally irrelevant.112 Conservatives too often charge liberal jurists with willfully disregarding law, even
when those jurists may well be operating in good faith from plausible jurisprudential accounts that rule certain non-originalist and non-textualist considerations legally relevant.113
Truth is not one-sided. Law is not simple. “Certitude is not the test of
certainty.”114 Those who exercise the power of judicial review in a democratic society should heed Scalia’s insistent demand that they undertake seriously to justify their exercise of this power. That is an ethical obligation. But
they, and the rest of us, should renounce the example Scalia set of convincing ourselves that we alone have all the answers and of castigating those who
view things differently as liars and cheats. That is an ethical obligation, too.

110. Richard Ned Lebow, Tragedy, Politics and Political Science, 19 Int’l Rel. 329, 330
(2005).
111. See supra notes 20–21, 38–39 and accompanying text.
112. Here, for example, is Senator Barbara Boxer: “Engraved over the Supreme Court are
the words, and I quote, ‘Equal Justice Under Law’. It does not say equal justice under law
except for women. But yet, that is what the Hobby Lobby case says.” The Rachel Maddow
Show, Transcript 07/09/14, MSNBC (July 9, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/tran
scripts/rachel-maddow-show/2014-07-09 [https://perma.cc/72TY-J3GM].
113. And here is Senator Ted Cruz: “To see the court behaving as it is today, as a superlegislature, simply enacting the policy preferences of the elite judges who are serving upon it, is
a profound betrayal of their judicial oaths of office and of the constitutional design that has
protected our liberty for over two centuries.” Katie Zezima, Cruz Once Clerked for a Chief
Justice, but He’s No Longer a Friend of the Court, Wash. Post (July 6, 2015), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/inside-ted-cruzs-new-war-on-the-supreme-court/2015/07/06/efa8fb5
4-20bf-11e5-aeb9-a411a84c9d55_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z3BX-AFBB].
114. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 40 (1918).

